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Note
Opportunity Lost: More of the
Same in Sale of Corporate Control
Cases
Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1978).
I INTRODUCTION
In 1975 the market value of Laurel Harness Racing Association,
Inc.'s common stock fluctuated between $7.50 and $10 per share.'
That year, Richard Hutchison, Jr., sold his common stock for $43.75
per share.2 Hutchison was able to obtain that inflated price be-
cause he sold more than just common stock he sold the controlling
interest in the corporation.3
That transaction and others like it have prompted numerous
commentators 4 and courts5 to question the legal and equitable as-
pects of a controlling shareholder's right to receive a premium for
his or her stock. Discussion has focused primarily on two issues:
(1) whether the controlling shareholder when disposing of his or
her interest has a fiduciary duty toward the minority shareholders;
and (2) whether the controlling interest and the premium paid for
1. Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259, 1261 (4th Cir. 1978).
2. Id. at 1261.
3. Id. at 1260.
4. See, e.g., A. BERLE & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 239-44 (1933); Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportu-
nity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L REV. 505 (1965); Bayne, The Sale-of-
Control Premium The Definition, 53 MmIN. L. REv. 485 (1969); Berle, The Price
of Power: Sale of Corporate Control, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 628 (1965); Hazen,
Transfer of Corporate Control and Duties of Controlling Sharehold-
ers-Common Law, Tender Offers, Investment Companies-And a Proposal
for Reform, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1023 (1977); Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the
Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply to Professor Andrews, 32 U. CHI. L. REv.
420 (1965); O'Neal, Sale of a Controlling Corporate Interest: Bases of Possible
Seller Liability, 38 U. Prrr. L REV. 9 (1976).
5. See, e.g., Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973); McDaniel v.
Painter, 418 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1969); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955); Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal
Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
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it belong to the controlling shareholder, all the shareholders, or to
the corporation.
Views on these issues cover a wide spectrum. At one extreme it
is argued that the premium paid to the controlling shareholder is
illegal per se. Professor Berle, an advocate of this view, premises
his position on the rationale that control is a corporate asset, and
as such, premiums paid for control belong in equity to all share-
holders.6 Berle reasons:
By its corporation statute, the state grants each corporation capacity to
choose a board of directors for management of its affairs. It directs exer-
cise of that capacity through the stockholder's vote. By the certificate of
incorporation, it gives the incorporators power to assign the vote evenly
among all shares outstanding or evenly among all the shares of a specified
class or classes. By statute in most states, and by general doctrine, the
rights of each share of stock within each class must be identical. It is
wholly impractical to require a unanimous vote to elect directors; conse-
quently in all normal situations a majority is authorized to elect the direc-
tors prevailing over the votes of the minority. Essentially, this is nothing
more than a device to assure continued management and functioning it is
a corporate power, though exercised by individual stockholders. It does
not authorize or permit a management thus constituted to distinguish be-
tween majority and minority shareholders: management power does not
include that privilege. The position of a majority shareholder, with his ca-
pacity to control, is thus not a "property right" in the same sense as is his
right to participate in dividends, or in liquidation or the like. His control
power is really adventitious, a byproduct of the corporate capacity to
choose a board of directors by less than unanimity. This is why the con-
trol power-capacity to choose a management-is a corporate asset, not
an individual one.7
Another argument in this vein is that the premium is illegal be-
cause it constitutes a bribe.8 Professor Bayne bases this conclu-
sion on the premise that a holder of the controlling interest is a
trustee of the corporation. In this capacity, Bayne believes the
holder should have a fiduciary duty to choose a successor with
suitable moral integrity, managerial and organizational profi-
ciency, social acceptability and health.9 The premium is viewed as
a bribe paid by the buyer to induce the seller to breach his or her
fiduciary duty, and thus should be disallowed.
A less extreme position is taken by Professor Andrews,' 0 who is
not concerned with the payment of the premium itself. He feels
that the controlling shareholder has the right to get whatever price
he or she can for the controlling interest." However, the premium
is acceptable to Andrews only as long as every shareholder is af-
6. A. BERLE & G. MEANs, supra note 4, at 244, Berle, supra note 4, at 629.
7. Berle, supra note 4, at 637-38.
8. Bayne, supra note 4, at 490.
9. Id. at 497.
10. Andrews, supra note 4, at 516.
11. Id. at 506.
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forded an equal opportunity to sell his or her shares of stock, or a
pro rata portion of them, on the same basis as the controlling
shareholder. 12 The rationale is that
each stockholder is entitled to share proportionately in the profits of the
enterprise; from the stockholder's point of view a sale of stock is one very
important way of realizing a profit on his investment; profits from stock
sales ought to be regarded as profits of the enterprise subject to equal
sharing among shareholders just as much as profits realized through cor-
porate action.
1 3
At the other end of the spectrum is the view held by a majority
of the courts. The traditional rule has been
that every stockholder, including a majority holder, is at liberty to dispose
of his shares at any time and for any price to which he may agree without
being liable to other stockholders.., as long as he does not dominate,
interfere with, or mislead other stockholders in exercising the same
rights.
14
However, the trend today is to restrict this broad rule. The courts
have refused to adopt the doctrines advanced by Berle, Baynes, or
Andrews.15 Currently, the following rule prevails:
The right of control is ordinarily a right inherent in ownership or control of
a majority of the stock, and if a purchaser pays a premium; i.e., a price
greater than the fair value of the stock, merely for the right of control as an
investment, with no foreseeable looting and no appropriation or frustra-
tion of a corporate business opportunity, and no inherent unfairness to the
minority shareholders ... the minority stockholders have no right to
share in such premium .... 16
Notwithstanding contemporary standards, courts have not pro-
duced any uniform guidelines in applying this rule.
The courts' refusal to adopt the Berle-Bayne approach that control pre-
miums are per se invalid has left an analytical morass of hybrid theories
that may be utilized to recapture a control premium. Each theory may
seem justified by the facts of a particular case, but when considered col-
lectively, they fall far short of forming a coherent body of law. The ab-
sence of a consistent framework has resulted in a series of obstacles for
the unwary corporate planner as well as some tools for the wily corporate
litigator.
1
"
The recent case of Clagett v. Hutchison18 exemplifies the hap-
hazard analysis in the sale of control area. The United States Dis-
12. Id. at 515.
13. Id. at 521.
14. Roby v. Dunnett, 88 F.2d 68, 69 (10th Cir. 1937).
15. "We have read the law review articles cited by counsel [Berle's, Andrews',
Jennings'] and conclude that they neither state the law of the forum nor the
rules generally applied in other jurisdictions." McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d
545, 548 (10th Cir. 1969).
16. Thompson v. Hambrick 508 S.W.2d 949, 952-53 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). See also
note 5 supra, & cases cited therein.
17. Hazen, supra note 4, at 1060.
18. 583 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1978).
1979]
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trict Court for the State of Maryland rejected the contention that
the leading theories are law.19 Instead of establishing a compre-
hensive test for determining the legality of a sale, the court em-
ployed a vague factual test, determining the case on the
circumstances peculiar to the transaction involved.
II. FACTS
Between 1975 and 1977, a series of transactions occurred involv-
ing the controlling interest of Laurel Harness Racing Association,
Inc. (Laurel). The first of these transactions was the 1975 sale by
the major shareholder, Hutchison. That sale involved Hutchison
receiving a substantial premium20 for his stock, and included offers
by the purchasers on the same terms to minority shareholders des-
ignated by Hutchison.21 Within a year, the purchasers 22 trans-
ferred an unspecified portion of their stock to a fourth party;23 the
four controlled Laurel until 1977 when they sold their entire inter-
ests.24
Laurel's minority shareholders sought to hold all parties in-
volved in these transactions liable for damages allegedly sustained
as a result of the sales. They sought compensation for the de-
crease in value of their common stock resulting from the purchas-
ers' mismanagement of the corporation and diversion of corporate
funds for their personal use.2 5 The minority interest holders al-
leged that Hutchison should be held responsible for the damage
done by his purchasers in that he breached the fiduciary duties
owed to them when the sale was made. The first of these duties,
was to investigate the character, integrity, financial stability and
managerial ability of his potential purchasers when it was appar-
ent that the purchasers would defraud, loot, and mismanage the
company.26 Furthermore, Hutchison was alleged to have breached
his fiduciary duties by failing to afford the minority shareholders
an equal opportunity to sell their interest to the purchasers on the
same, or substantially the same, terms as he was offered.27 In ad-
dition, the minority shareholders sought to hold the purchasers lia-
ble for aiding and abetting Hutchison in the breach of those
19. Id. at 1264.
20. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
21. 583 F.2d at 1261.
22. Id. The purchasers were Steven Sobechko, James Sobechko and Joseph
Shamy.
23. Id. Daniel Rizk was the transferee of their stock.
24. Id.
25. Clagett v. Hutchison, No. HM76-1204, slip op. at 1 (D. Md. Jan. 20, 1977), affid,
583 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1978).
26. 583 F.2d at 1260.
27. Id.
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duties. 28 The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground
that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.29
Appeal was subsequently made to the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.30 The appellate court affirmed the decision, hold-
ing that on the facts of the case, neither of the plaintiffs' theories of
recovery stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.31 With
regard to the breach of duty to investigate the prospective pur-
chaser, the court found that the circumstances surrounding the
transaction were not sufficiently "suspicious" to give rise to a
fiduciary duty.32 Furthermore, the court held that the laws of Ma-
ryland do not recognize a fiduciary duty which would require the
seller to afford the minority shareholders an equal opportunity to
share in the tender offer.33
III. ANALYSIS
A. Fiduciary Duty to Investigate
The Clagett court, following the trend in sale of control cases,
recognized that in certain sale situations the seller stands in a
fiduciary relation to minority shareholders.34 If the seller is in a
position to foresee the possibility that the subsequent purchaser
might loot or defraud the corporation or the remaining sharehold-
ers, then under this view he must investigate the intentions of the
purchaser. Additionally, the seller must refrain from completing
the transaction unless a reasonable man would conclude that no
fraud is intended or likely to result.3 5 In applying this rule the
court was faced with the problem of determining when the seller is
in a position to foresee the dishonorable intentions of the buyer.
The test espoused by the court was a rule of reasonableness, i.e.,
would a reasonable person become suspicious when confronted
with the circumstances of and surrounding the transaction?
The problem inherent in the use of the reasonable person stan-
dard is reflected in the court's opinion. The prime difficulty is in
devining from the decision exactly what is required by the stan-
dard. In applying the test, the court was forced to rely heavily on
the particular facts of the case, but in so doing, it did not set up any
beneficial guidelines for those interested in selling control. There-
28. Id.
29. Clagett v. Huchison, No. HM76-1204, slip op. at 9 (D. Md. Jan. 20, 1977), affd,
583 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1978).
30. Clagget v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1978).
31. Id. at 1260.
32. Id. at 1263.
33. Id. at 1264.
34. Id. at 1262.
35. Id.
1979]
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fore, unless every sale of control involved similar buyers, similar
prices, a similar corporation, and a similar format to those in the
Clagett case, the holding is of little predictive use. The corporate
planner and future seller are left to conjecture whether even the
common aspects of sale of control transactions would be consid-
ered suspicious by the courts. One has no manner of ascertaining
whether the receipt of a premium makes the situation suspicious
or not; nor is it evident whether the quickness with which buyers
consumate the sale is a determinative factor. A comparison with
some of the sale of control cases that have employed the reasona-
bleness standard highlights this uncertainty. For example, in
Clagett the fact that Hutchison received a premium of approxi-
mately $30 per share (300 percent of its worth) was not sufficiently
suspicious to raise a duty to investigate.3 6 Yet another court has
held that a $2.34 premium per share (188 percent of its worth) was
highly indicative of the nature of the transaction, and that the duty
to investigate was warranted.37
In Clagett, the court concluded that a six to twelve month wait-
ing period between the execution of the stock purchase agreement
and the closing of the transaction "constituted a prudent business
practice rather than 'suspicious' circumstances," 38 whereas in
Swinney v. Keebler Co.,39 the haste with which the sale was com-
pleted was considered a prudent business act and not suspicious. 4 0
In conjunction with the problem of predictability is the added
difficulty encountered with the rule's flexibility. Because the term
reasonableness is vague by its nature, the court may use the term
to reach any result it desires. This places an almost impossible
burden on the parties involved. While some flexibility is desirable
36. The court held that the payment was justified as it was a payment for control.
The court also stated that since the corporation was an on-going business
likely to develop further, the payment of the premium was not suspicious. Id.
at 1262.
37. [T]he inflated price paid by the Boston group for the banks' shares
has already been considered as evidence that they were primarily
interested in buying control, but I do not think it can be disregarded
as being also some indication that they had an improper purpose in
view. Why were the purchasers willing to pay so much for control?
Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 26 (E.D. Pa.
1940). The reason the payment of a premium is deemed indicative of a poten-
tial looter, is that it is assumed the buyer will be under pressure to recoup his
or her premium. If it does not appear that the profitability of the corporation
will be greatly improved under his or her management, it is feared that the
price will be recouped from the corporate treasury. See Hill, The Sale of Con-
trolling Shares, 70 HARV. L. REv. 986, 1012-13 (1957).
38. 583 F.2d at 1262-63.
39. 480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973). See text accompanying note 44 infra.
40. Id. at 579.
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in order to allow courts to reach equitable decisions,41 the rule
should not be so pliable as to allow courts to dictate another stan-
dard under the guise of reasonableness.
The Clagett court goes to extreme lengths to apply the reasona-
bleness standard, yet reaches a decision heavily favoring the
seller. In 1957, it was predicted by one commentator that "it would
ordinarily take rather strong evidence to convince a judge that the
seller was forwarned of such eventualities [i.e., looting]." 42 The
facts deemed "unsuspicious" in Clagett and those in Swinney v.
Keebler Co.43 upon which Clagett relies, give truth to this predic-
tion. Analyzing these two cases it would seem that despite the
"reasonable" label, the test applied is one of actual knowledge; i.e.,
the seller will be held liable for failure to investigate and for selling
control only when he or she has actual knowledge that the buyer
intends to loot the corporation.
Swinney involved a sale of the controlling interest of Meadors,
a candy factory, by Keebler Co. to Atlantic, a subsequent looter of
that corporation. The trial court deemed seven circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction as being sufficiently suspicious to war-
rant holding that the sellers, as reasonable persons, had a duty to
investigate:
(1) no one from Atlantic had any experience in the candy business, (2)
at the time the contract was executed no one from Atlantic had inspected
the "Meadors operation," (3) by the time of the closing only Atlantic's
accountant had examined Meadors to "any appreciable extent and he was
interested principally in the books and inventory," (4) Meadors had no
market of its own and the "profit as shown could not have been accepted
at face value by an outsider," (5) prior to the closing Atlantic had no nego-
tiations with Meadors' key employees concerning the continuation of the
business, (6) the sale was consummated with dispatch, and (7) Atlantic
had inquired as to availability of Meadors' funds for payment of the
purchase price.
4 4
The appellate court reversed, finding that under the reasonable-
ness standard these seven factors were not sufficiently suspicious
to warrant investigation. 4 5 This finding would only be accurate,
41. Professor Hazen stated that there are two advantages to the present unpre-
dictable, case-by-case bases for determining sale of control cases: "The obvi-
ous advantage of such an approach is to allow the courts to achieve an
equitable result in each case. Another advantage is that the corporate plan-
ner will have to scrutinize each transaction on its merits with an eye toward
giving the minority a fair deal." Hazen, supra note 4, at 1041. See also Hill,
supra note 37, at 987.
42. Hill, supra note 37, at 1013.
43. 480 F.2d 573, 579 (4th Cir. 1973).
44. Id. at 578.
45. In light of the facts and applicable law, plaintiffs' right to recover
turns on whether Keebler had sufficient knowledge to foresee the
likelihood of fraud so as to give rise to a duty to conduct a further
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however, if the reasonable person was defined as an astute busi-
nessman familiar with sale of control transactions. The court em-
phasized that there were plausible business explanations for the
way the transaction was carried out, and it gave the seller the ben-
efit of the doubt that he considered these explanations. 4 6 How-
ever, there were several other factors that the court failed to
discuss which indicate that it was using a much lower standard
than that of the reasonable person.47
One commentator,48 in analyzing Swinney, pointed out the fol-
lowing factors which indicate use of a lower standard: (1) the
court neglected to note that Meadors' major asset at the time of the
sale was cash, and as such Keebler should have been more sensi-
tive to the possibility of looting;49 (2) it viewed the seven factors
individually, failing to give any weight to the overall picture; and
(3) in down playing the significance of the seven factors, the court
put great weight on the fact that Atlantic gave no indication that it
planned to cease operation.5 0 Yet, this is a weak basis for decision
since most looters continue operation in order to conceal their
thievery.5 1
In Clagett the plaintiffs alleged that there were four circum-
stances which should have given Hutchison notice of his buyers'
motives: (1) a large premium was paid; (2) the transaction was
delayed over six months after the conclusion of the sales contract;
(3) the sales contract precluded any change in the company's
financial situation during that period; and (4) it was arranged that
not all shareholders would participate in the deal.52 The court
investigation and to satisfy itself, by the test of a reasonable man,
that no fraud was intended or likely to result before it consummated
the sale of control.
Id. at 578.
46. Id. at 578-80.
47. See 51 TEx. L. RaV. 1234 (1973).
48. Id. at 1237.
49. If the corporation's assets are found to be liquid in form, the courts' have
tended to be more wary of the size of premium paid for the controlling inter-
est, since the corporation is far more vulnerable to looters. As pointed out by
one court:
No doubt, if this corporation had been an industrial, mining, or com-
mercial enterprise, whose physical assets and business might have
potentialities which a purchaser might believe he could develop if
given control, the price would not mean so very much. It was, how-
ever, merely an investment company, and the ultimate assets-what
was really being sold-were nothing but the ready equivalent of cash
in marketable securities.
Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 26 (E.D. Pa.
1940). See also Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 654 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
50. 51 TEx. L. REv. 1234, 1237 (1973).
51. Id.
52. 583 F.2d at 1261.
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noted that these facts alone would not make a reasonable person
suspicious.5 3 But one has to wonder why someone was willing to
pay 300 percent over the average market price; how that person
planned to recoup his or her investment; and why he or she would
be willing to pay a premium for minority shares? Even though
there were plausible business reasons for the way the transaction
was set up, they were unorthodox enough to warrant investigation.
This is especially true if a person did not know of these reasons,
and had a fiduciary duty to investigate due to the fact that the loot-
ing was foreseeable.
It should be noted that the court failed to adequately deal with
the fact that the purchasers made offers to minority shareholders
designated by Hutchison to buy at the same price. In disposing of
this fact, the court merely stated that 'selling one's own stock and
including others in such a sale, is a private act, sanctioned in law,
and not alone 'suspicious.' ",s4 This appears to be inconsistent with
the earlier conclusion that the sale of control is not a private act,
that it is an act subject to various limitations. The court seemed to
ignore the fact that this was not just a sale of stock, but a sale of
control.
Furthermore, the majority opinion in Clagett stated that the se-
lection of certain minority shareholders to participate in the sale
was not suspicious in itself.5 5 Contrary to the court's position, the
selection was not the sole factor involved. The court's analysis
failed to tie this fact in with the other three factors.55 If the court
had viewed the transaction as a whole, it is probable that this one
factor would have appeared more suspicious, as would the other
factors. As noted by the dissenting judge:
[T]he conclusion that the premium simply reflected the price of control is
dispelled by the allegation that the majority stockholder insisted that the
purchasers acquire the stock of certain favored minority stockholders.
Other stockholders, including the appellants, were not even told of the
proposed transaction. The use of such leverage to favor one group of mi-
nority stockholders over another justifies the inference, at least at this
stage of the proceedings, that the majority accurately foresaw that disas-
ter was likely to befall the corporation.
57
The court's piecemeal analysis precluded finding any one of the
factors suspicious.5 8 Thus, it is apparent that the only factor that
53. Id. at 1262.
54. Id. at 1263.
55. Id.
56. The court analyzed the other three points in connection with each other but
failed to do this with the fourth point.
57. 583 F.2d at 1266.
58. The court's analysis of the facts, like that of the court in Swinney, consisted
of giving plausible business explanations for the various factors of the trans-
action, and on this basis holding that Hutchison had no reason to be "suspi-
1979]
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the court would have held sufficient to impose liability on the
seller would have been that of actual knowledge.
The standard of actual knowledge has been used in only one
sale of control case to date, Levy v. American Beverage Corp.59
Not only did that court deem that a seller is liable only if he or she
actually knew of the purchaser's mischievous intent, it also held
that, "[t] he law does not require one to act on the assumption that
a person with whom a business transaction, even of large amount,
is had, will commit a fraudulent or criminal act if given the oppor-
tunity to do S0."'60 As many commentators have indicated, the use-
fulness of this standard is best reflected in the statement, to
"require knowledge of intended looting on the part of the seller in
order to impose liability on him places a premium on the 'head in
the sand' approach to corporate sales."'61
The inadequacy of the actual knowledge standard is found in its
basic inequity. Sale of control cases involve a conflict between two
policies. On one hand, it is desirable to have controlling sharehold-
ers able to freely sell their stock. However, this policy may conflict
with the protection the corporation and its minority shareholders
need from the injury which may result from sale of control transac-
tions. 62 The best solution involves a compromise. The actual
knowledge standard does not go far enough in meeting the needs
of the minority shareholder. As pointed out by the district court in
Swinney, "The requirement of actual knowledge of the intended
looting, necessarily eliminating any standard of care, would, by
sanctioning the reckless or irresponsible sale of corporate control,
command persons having non-controlling interest in the corpora-
tion to the mercy of the holder of the controlling interest. '63
This balance can be achieved by the reasonable person stan-
dard. Under it, restrictions are placed on the seller requiring him
or her to act with care while at the same time allowing a sale that
does not endanger the corporation. However, the balance is in a
vulnerable position since it allows the courts to use the actual
knowledge test in every way but name. In addition, the lack of pre-
cious." There was no attempt to discuss the factors in any other light. Id. at
1262-63.
59. 265 A.D. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1942).
60. Id. at 219, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 527.
61. Swinney v. Keebler Co., 329 F. Supp. 216 (D.S.C. 1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 573 (4th
Cir. 1973). See, e.g., Note, Corporations-Liability of Shareholder who Sells
Control to Looters, 39 Mo. L. REv. 596, 600 (1974); 51 TEx. L. REV. 1234, 1241
(1973).
62. Note, supra note 61, at 597. 51 TEx. L. REv. 1234, 1238 (1973).
63. 329 F. Supp. at 224. See also Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U.
PA. L. REv. 725, 838 (1956).
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dictability may have a chilling effect on many sellers deciding
whether or not to sell. This in turn, hampers the policy of free
transferability. Handicapped by these difficulties, the effective-
ness of the reasonableness standard is questionable.
A possible solution would be to impose upon the seller a higher
standard of fiduciary responsibility. Such a standard would in-
volve full disclosure of the sale of control, as well as a duty to in-
vestigate prospective purchasers in all sale of control
transactions.6 Under this standard it would be unnecessary to de-
termine whether the circumstances surrounding the transactions
were "suspicious" enough to give rise to the duty to investigate.
The idea of imposing a duty to investigate in all sale of control
cases was first offered by Professor Hill in 1957.65 Hill felt that due
to the seriousness and complexity of such transactions, sellers out
of their own interest tend to inform themselves of the credibility of
the purchasing parties. Thus he saw the question as not whether
the controlling shareholders should be compelled to investigate,
but whether this investigation should be broadened to include the
possible impact the transaction would have on the remaining
shareholders. 66 Since such inquiries are made anyway, he con-
cluded the investigation could be extended to protect the interest
of the minority without placing much of a burden on the seller.67
Balance between the two desired policies is reflected in Hill's
burden of proof rules. The rules are premised on the following as-
sumptions:
that the sale of control for personal profit is not presumptively wrong; that
in the light of the foregoing premise and in the interest of avoiding uncer-
tainties which themselves could cause undue restriction upon the transfer
of control, doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of the sellers; and
that information derived by the sellers from the inquiry they are charged
with making is information peculiarly within their possession and should
in fairness be produced by the sellers at the trial.6
To supplement this duty, full disclosure of the tender offer to all
the shareholders would be required before it is consummated.
This would serve several useful purposes. First, it would provide a
check for sale of control cases. Minority shareholders with the
knowledge of who the purchasers were, could institute their own
investigation. If the minority holders discovered that the buyer in-
tended to loot or defraud the corporation, they could inform the
seller and perhaps compel him to stop the sale.
64. One court has called for such a high standard of duty. See Estate of Hooper
v. Virgin Inlands, 427 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1970).
65. Hill, supra note 37, at 1025-28.
66. Id. at 1025.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1027.
1979]
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Secondly, if the investigation was conducted by all the parties
affected by the transaction rather than exclusively by the majority
holder, it would allow for a more thorough investigation. The ma-
jority shareholder who is seeking to leave the corporation ordina-
rily limits the investigation to that which is necessary to protect
his or her own security interest, and to negate any possible liabil-
ity. On the other hand, the minority shareholders, who after the
sale would still have an interest in the corporation, would look into
the possible effects the new management would have on the corpo-
ration as well as on their own interests. From the various vantage
points the circumstances may not only appear different, but cer-
tain circumstances might appear of more relative importance.
This might also force the court to view the transaction not only
from the point of view of the seller, but also from that of the corpo-
ration and the minority interest. It would allow the court to in-
quire more fully into the totality of the transaction, and to more
zealously guard the balance between the two desired policies.
For example, in viewing the sale of control from only the sellers'
point of view, the court in Clagett missed an extremely important
effect the transaction would have had on the corporation. As the
dissenting opinion pointed out, the corporation's state racing li-
cense, without which no race could be run, was dependent upon
the competency and integrity of the owners. If the new manage-
ment turned out to be corrupt or incompetent the license could be
revoked by the racing commission. 69 Thus, this factor should have
been considered in the investigation before the majority share-
holder was allowed to sell his or her interest. If both the majority
and minority shareholders had investigated, all the relevant as-
pects of the deal could have been explored.
A third function of the full disclosure rule would be to give the
minority interests a right to determine their own destiny. It would
allow the minority shareholders to make an informed decision on
whether or not they wished to remain in the corporation under the
new management. With notice of a future sale, they could sell out
before being subjected to any risks the prospective new manage-
ment might occasion.
In addition, full disclosure of the tender offer would give the
seller a possible defense if the minority shareholder failed to act or
to investigate. If the minority shareholders have a substantial in-
terest at stake, their failure to act could indicate their acquies-
cence in the deal. Thus, the shareholders would not be able to
claim that they had been treated unfairly or that they were sub-
jected to unfair surprise.
69. 583 F.2d at 1267.
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Finally, the duty to disclose would serve as a check on those
sales of control which are in reality a front for the sale of a corpo-
rate asset 70 a corporate opportunity7 ' or a corporate office. 72 Dis-
closure of the terms of the sale contract would make the true
nature of the sale apparent before it occurs. The shareholders
could then seek to enjoin any improper sale. Furthermore, having
to make a full disclosure of the terms or be liable for the failure to
do so might make the seller more hesitant to sell anything more
than actual control.
In the Clagett case the failure of the court to take advantage of
the opportunity to impose a higher fiduciary duty on the seller of
control is surprising, since Hutchison was president of the corpora-
tion at the time of the sale, a point which was not discussed by the
court. While there is a controversy as to whether majority share-
holders owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation, there is no such
controversy when discussing corporate officers and directors,7 3 for
it is well settled that
1. Directors and other officers must exercise the utmost good faith in all
transactions touching their duties to the corporation and its property, and
in their dealings with and for the corporation they are held to the same
strict rule of honesty and fair dealings between themselves and their prin-
cipal as other agents.
2. All their acts must be for the benefit of the corporation and not for
their own benefit ....
3. They are not permitted to profit as individuals by virtue of their posi-
tion.
4. Any profits received by them from the company's property or business
belongs to the company and they hold the same as trustees for the benefit
of the corporation to its stockholders.
7 4
In Gerdes v. Reynolds,7 5 an early control premium case, the dis-
tinction was made between duties owed by one merely selling con-
trol, and one who was an officer selling control. The case involved
a sale by the corporate officers to subsequent looters of the corpo-
ration. The contract of sale also included an agreement that the
70. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
See Hazen, supra note 4, at 1034.
71. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1969).
72. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
73. It has been recognized by some courts that in certain situations the majority
shareholders have the same fiduciary obligations as do the directors. See,
e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250
U.S. 483, 491-92 (1919); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947);
Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1969). For fiduciary duties of officers and directors, see 3 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE CoPoRAnoNs §§ 850-860 (rev. ed. 1975).
74. 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 73, at 175-76 (footnotes omitted).
75. 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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sellers would resign their positions as directors, and would elect
the buyers to fill their positions. The court held that the sellers, as
majority shareholders, had not breached their fiduciary duty.7 6
Moreover, since the new owners would be able to vote in whom-
ever they chose, it held that the sale of the majority interest with a
seriatum change in the board was not illegal as it was an inherent
feature of the controlling interest.77
However, the court held that they had breached their fiduciary
duty as officers and were thus liable to the corporation.7 8 It held
that directors and officers owed a fiduciary duty to the corporation,
and they could not resign if they were aware that they would leave
the corporation in improper care:
A man dealing with his own affairs may be as confiding and trusting as he
pleases, and may be grossly negligent without being guilty of bad faith;
but a fiduciary charged with the care of the property of others must be
reasonably vigilant, and will not be heard to say that he did not know what
the circumstances plainly indicated or that his faith in people was such
that obvious opportunities for wrongdoing gave him no inkling that wrong-
doing might be done .... 79
Even though the court in Clagett chose to use a reasonableness
standard, it should have noted that Hutchison was an officer, and
that as such he owed a greater degree of diligence to the corpora-
tion. Furthermore, the court should have placed greater emphasis
on the effects of the transaction on the corporation, determining
whether looting or fraud was foreseeable.
76. Speaking of the majority shareholders' fiduciary duties, the court stated:
The cases in which majority stockholders have been said to stand
in a fiduciary relation to the minority have been cases in which the
court was speaking of a matter of corporate management committed
by statute directly to the stockholders rather than to directors ....
or cases in which the majority have in fact assumed the management
of the corporation's property or business ... or cases in which the
majority have undertaken to act for the minority .... Such cases
may not exhaust the entire list of situations in which the majority
may be held to be fiduciaries, but certainly as to matters not relating
to management of the corporation's business or property, and in the
absence of any express undertaking, the stockholders do not stand in
a fiduciary relation to each other .... Clearly, therefore, in the mat-
ter of selling their stock the holders of a majority thereof, whether
one or a group, act for themselves alone and not as trustees, either
technically or substantially, for the other stockholders, and no fiduci-
ary duty is violated by such a sale, even though such sale ultimately
bring about a change in the directorate.
Id. at 650 (citations omitted).
77. Id.at 650.
78. Id. at 659.
79. Id. at 653.
[Vol. 58:891
SALE OF CONTROL
B. Equal Opportunity for Minority Shareholders
Once again exhibiting the contemporary trend in sale of control
cases, the Clagett court dismissed the plaintiffs' allegation that the
defendants breached their fiduciary duty by failing to afford all the
shareholders an equal opportunity to sell their shares.80 The
ground cited was simply that the law of Maryland does not impose
such a fiduciary duty.8 1
This reluctance of the courts to accept the doctrine of equal op-
portunity is in line with their acceptance of the reasonableness
standard for the duty to investigate. Like the reasonable person
standard, the rejection of this rule allows the court to maintain a
balance between the policies of encouraging free alienability of
stock and of imposing restraints when the corporation would be
endangered by the sale. The adoption of the equal opportunity
rule would tip the scales against free alienability, for "the rule, if
applied, would likely result in the stifling of many financial trans-
actions due either to the purchaser's inability to purchase the ad-
ditional shares, or from a lack of inclination to purchase those
shares."82
Failure to accept the doctrine is also indicative of the courts'
recognition that there is a difference between majority and minor-
ity stock.83 The majority's stock is worth more because the domi-
nant shareholders have the right to participate in the corporate
profits as any other shareholders, and they have the power to in-
crease those profits by implementing what they believe to be the
best policies through their choice of management.84 In addition,
people are willing to pay more for majority stock because it en-
ables them to deal with an individual or small group, rather than a
"multitude" of minority shareholders. Not only is there more cer-
tainty and convenience in dealing with smaller groups, it is also
less expensive. 85 Furthermore the minority shareholders are
likely to sell for less,86 as it is more reflective of the value of their
stock.
Finally, under the reasonable person standard, it is the selling
shareholder that is given the duty to investigate. The premium, it
could be argued, is compensation for those duties. As minority
80. 583 F.2d at 1264. See also text accompanying notes 10-13 supra.
81. 583 F.2d at 1264.
82. Letts, Sales of Control Stock and the Rights of Minority Shareholders, 26 Bus.
LAw. 631, 644-46 (1971).
83. See also McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 548 (10th Cir. 1969); Tyron v. Smith,
191 Or. 172, 178, 229 P.2d 251, 254 (1951).
84. Letts, supra note 82, at 638.
85. Andrews, supra note 4, at 536.
86. Id. at 533.
1979]
906 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:891
shareholders are not so burdened, they would not be entitled to
share in any of the premium.
In light of the fact that majority interests are inherently worth
more than minority interests, the only justification for the use of
the equal opportunity rule would be if it was effective against elim-
inating potential looters. Such effectiveness is highly questionable
as one commentator has noted:
These problems [looting and corporate squeezes] result from abuse of the
control position. They can arise at any time and do not require any trans-
fer of control. Looting and corporate squeezing have naturally tended to
occur, if at all, shortly after the transfers of control, when the power to
accomplish them is first acquired. This would be equally so, however,
with or without reference to any rules concerning transfers of control at a
premium.
87
The drastic approach of the equal opportunity rule, even if it were
effective, would not be necessary if the more exacting fiduciary
duty standard was applied.88 That alone should afford adequate
protection.
Illustrative of the role the equal opportunity rule should play
are three cases which held that the seller breached the fiduciary
duty owed the corporation.89 In Perlman v. Feldmann,90 the court
held that equal participation was necessary, since more than con-
trol of the corporation was sold.91 The court found that a corporate
asset had been appropriated, 92 an obvious violation of a fiduciary
duty.
In Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 93 the court held that the
"comprehensive rule of good faith and inherent fairness to the mi-
nority in any transaction where control of the corporation is mate-
rial properly governs controlling shareholders" 94 in California.
The court found that the controlling shareholders breached this
fiduciary duty by freezing out the minority while taking advantage
of a corporate opportunity to sell their interest.95 Thus, the court
87. Letts, supra note 82, at 646.
88. See text accompanying notes 78-84 supra.
89. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955);
Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1969); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
90. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
91. Id. at 178.
92. Id. See also Clagett v. Hutchison, No. HIM76-1204, slip op. at 7 (D. Md. Jan. 20,
1977).
93. 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
94. Id. at 112, 460 P.2d at 474, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
95. Id. at 115, 460 P.2d at 476, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 604. See also Clagett v. Hutchison,
No. HM76-1204, slip op. at 8 (D. Md. Jan. 20, 1977). The majority shareholders
in order to take advantage of a bullish market for their type stock, formed a
holding company to which they sold their stock and then the holding com-
pany went public. The minority shareholders of the closely held corporation,
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held that under such circumstances the minority should be given a
pro rata share of the profits.96
In the third case, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.,97 it was held
that there was a breach of fiduciary duty when the majority failed
to offer the minority an equal opportunity to sell its shares due to
the fact that the entity was a close corporation.9 8 By definition, a
close corporation has (1) a small number of stockholders, (2) no
ready market for its corporate stock, and (3) a substantial majority
stockholder.9 9 Shareholders in such a corporation were held to
owe a high fiduciary duty to each other in all situations, a duty of
utmost good faith and loyalty, similar to that one partner would
owe another. The logical extension of this rule to the sale of con-
trol situation is that
the controlling stockholders must cause the corporation to offer each
stockholder an equal opportunity to sell a ratable number of his shares to
the corporation at an identical price .... The controlling group may not,
consistent with its strict duty to the minority, utilize its control of the cor-
poration to obtain special advantages and disproportionate benefits from
its share ownership. 10 0
Thus, courts which have applied the equal opportunity rule
have done so as a remedy for breach of fiduciary duty, 0' as a
means to an end,10 2 and as a complement to the fiduciary stan-
dard. l0 3 If the solution previously proposed' 04 is adopted by the
courts, and majority shareholders are found to owe duties similar
to those of officers and directors, the equal opportunity rule should
be adopted to rectify the situation when the breach is found. It
should be limited to that role, for as pointed out by the Clagett
court, 05 it is otherwise contrary to corporate law, as it currently
exists, and is unnecessarily cumbersome on one's right to free
alienability of stock.
not being able to sell to the holding company, were unable to take advantage
of the public market. In finding that the majority had not acted in good faith
or with fairness to the minority shareholders, the court awarded the latter
damages amounting to the amount they would have realized had they been
able to participate in such sales. 1 Cal. 3d at 117-18, 460 P.2d at 478, 81 Cal.
Rptr. at 605-06.
96. 1 Cal. 3d at 119, 460 P.2d at 478, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
97. 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
98. Id. at 593, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
99. Id. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 511.
100. Id. at 598, 328 N.E.2d at 518.
101. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
102. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1969).
103. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
104. See text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
105. 583 F.2d at 1264.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Clagett leaves both owners of controlling interests and owners
of minority interests in a position worse than the one in which they
were prior to the decision. It is undeniable that a majority share-
holder is a fiduciary, but as pointed out by Justice Frankfurter-
"[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives
direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obli-
gations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to
discharge these obligations?"' 06 Clagett fails to answer these lat-
ter questions; the court merely adds to the confusion that already
exists. The court states that the standard to be applied in sale of
control cases is reasonableness; but it uses the much lower stan-
dard of actual knowledge. Minority shareholders are led to believe
that they can hold the control seller liable, only to find that it is
nearly impossible to prove that the seller breached the duty owed
them. The seller is no better off for there is always the possibility
that the court might apply the standard it says it is applying. They
might find themselves liable for situations in which they carelessly
sold the interest; they might also find themselves liable in situa-
tions in which they took extreme precautions. Who is to say what
is reasonable? To date, the courts have failed to establish any
guidelines. Since the courts have refused to accept comprehensive
rules suggested by legal scholars, they should come up with a
scheme that will give some direction to those involved in sale of
control transactions. The courts must seek to maintain a balance
between free alienability of stock, and protection of the corpora-
tion. A good starting place would be for the courts to answer the
questions concerning the control seller's fiduciary duty, and to de-
velop a higher standard, imposing both a duty of full investigation
and disclosure in every sale.
Marianne M. Harvell '80
106. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
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